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Abstract 
In this paper, we estimate wage returns to investment in education for persons with 
disabilities in Nepal, using information on the timing of being impaired during school-age 
years as identifying instrumental variables for years of schooling.    We employ unique data 
collected from persons with hearing, physical, and visual impairments as well as nationally 
representative survey data from the Nepal Living Standard Survey 2003/2004 (NLSS II).   
After controlling for endogeneity bias arising from schooling decisions as well as sample 
selection bias due to endogenous labor participation, the estimated rate of returns to education 
is very high among persons with disabilities, ranging from 19.4 to 33.2%.    The coexistence 
of these high returns to education and limited years of schooling suggest that supply side 
constraints in education to accommodate persons with disabilities and/or there are credit 
market imperfections.    Policies to eliminate these barriers will mitigate poverty among 
persons with disabilities, the largest minority group in the world. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Eighty percent of the world’s people with disabilities live in developing countries, 
making the worldwide disabled population collectively one of the poorest and most 
marginalized segments of society (ILO, 2007; UN 2006; UNDP, 2006). Historically, people 
with disabilities were treated as passive recipients of support based on feelings of pity.   
During the civil rights era of the 1960s and 70s, a wide variety of strategies and programs 
intended to effect a shift from policies (whether formal or informal) based on exclusion with 
targeted charities, toward policies embracing persons with disabilities were introduced 
worldwide (Cook and Burke, 2002).    However, it is still unclear to what extent inclusive 
development for persons with disabilities has been successfully implemented in developing 
countries.    Indeed, low-income countries have significantly limited information on the 
socioeconomic status of people with disabilities. 
The purpose of this paper is to bridge this gap by focusing on the role of education in 
the labor market of a developing economy, namely, Nepal.    Numerous existing studies in 
both developed and developing countries have shown that better-educated individuals earn 
higher wages, experience less unemployment, and work in better occupations (higher wages, 
greater job security, etc.) than their less-educated counterparts (Card, 1999).    These returns 
to investment in education have been quantified for nondisabled people since the late 1950s 
(Card, 1999, 2001; Heckman et al., 2006; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004).    Even in the 
case of people with disabilities, there have been two significant studies on returns to 
education performed in the US (Hollenbeck and Kimmel, 2008).    Stern examined the 
problems of measurement and endogeneity when creating a definition of disabilities for 
census-taking purposes (Stern, 1989), while DeLaire and Hotchkiss (DeLaire, 2000, 2001; 
Hotchkiss, 2003) investigated employer discrimination in the labor market.    However, as far 
as developing countries are concerned, almost no studies that estimate the return to education   3
of persons with disabilities can be found.
1    Therefore, with this paper, we aim to at least 
partially fill this gap in existing knowledge by estimating the wage returns to education of 
individuals with disabilities in Nepal.    By doing so, we intend to help identify constraints 
preventing people with disabilities from becoming socially and economically independent, 
and from being fully included in society.    Such an analysis will better enable governments 
and concerned organizations to design policies to mitigate poverty among persons with 
disabilities, the largest minority group in the world. 
We believe that there are two novel aspects to our study.    To begin with, the first 
author has collected unique data from persons with hearing, physical, and visual impairments 
living in Nepal’s Kathmandu Valley using carefully-structured questionnaires.  The  size  and 
coverage of this survey are unprecedentedly large in Nepal; it is essentially the first of its 
kind, given the general lack of studies on disability issues in Nepal (Lamichhane, 2009).   
We also checked the reliability of the results using available information on disability from 
the nationally representative survey data of the Nepal Living Standard Survey 2003/2004 
(NLSS II). 
Second, information on each of the three types of impairment has been used as 
identifying instrumental variables in order to estimate a Mincerian wage equation.    The 
labor market outcome of education is not dependent on a distinction between congenital or 
acquired disabilities; rather, because the education of disabled people is confined to 
institutional settings in Nepal, the main barrier to education arises from institutional problems 
or, more succinctly, from the fact of disability itself.    Hence, using congenital or acquired 
disability information as well as the timing of being impaired, we may be able to identify the 
                                                  
1  The only study we are aware of is the one by Mori and Yamagata (2009), who collected survey data 
to estimate the returns to education.    Their OLS and Tobit estimate reveal that the estimated rates of 
returns are 24.7% and 30.1% respectively.    However, their estimates are likely to be biased owing to 
endogeneity arising from unobserved heterogeneity.     4
causal effect of education on earnings.    As Card (2000, 2001) and Heckman, Lochner, and 
Todd (2006) have pointed out, identifying the causal effect of education on labor market 
earnings is one of the most important issues in labor economics; hence, we believe that we 
are making an important contribution to the existing studies. 
To create a preliminary outline of our paper, we worked with three main sets of 
findings.  First,  in  Nepal,  education exerts a significant influence on wages, with estimated 
returns to education for people with disabilities ranging from 19.4 to 33.2%.    This is a 
significantly higher estimate than those for nondisabled people in developing countries, as 
reported in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).
2    Second, in spite of the very high returns 
to education, our estimates confirm that hearing-impaired people have benefited from 
significantly fewer years of schooling than people with visual and/or physical impairments.   
Indeed, there are significant institutional barriers in the Nepalese education system for people 
with hearing impairments: there is only one school for the deaf and hard of hearing in the 
entire Kathmandu Valley.    Furthermore, thus far, no arrangement has been made to facilitate 
the higher education of this group beyond the first 10 years of schooling.    These barriers, 
however, could be eliminated in the future through appropriate policy interventions to 
improve the quantity and quality of schools for people with hearing impairments.    Finally, 
according to our estimation results, around 20% to 30% of the wage differences can be 
explained by differences in job position (white- or blue-collar status) and job tenure (full- or 
part-time employment status).   These  results  suggest the importance of labor market policies 
to improve job position and tenure stability for people with disabilities. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we explain our empirical 
strategies for identifying the causal effect of education on earnings among people with 
disabilities; Section 3 describes the data set from Nepal; and Section 4 discusses our findings.   
                                                  
2  According to Parajuli (1999), the returns to education in Nepal are 9.7%.   5
Finally, in Section 5, we present concluding remarks. 
 
2. Empirical strategy 
 
Numerous studies regress log earnings (ln w) on years of schooling (S), and report estimated 
coefficients as the estimated returns to education (Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006; Card, 
1999, 2001).    The theoretical underpinning for such a semi-log earnings equation is 
attributed to Jacob Mincer, with the standard Mincer wage equation usually specified as 
follows: 
 
(1)       log  w = rS + Xβ + u,  
 
where r represents the returns to education, i.e., how much the wage rate increases in 
response to an additional year of schooling.    X is a set of other determinants of wage 
earnings, and u is an error term. 
One of the most serious econometric problems of estimating equation (1) is that the 
cross-sectional correlation between education and earnings may differ from the causal effect 
of education owing to the correlation between the years of education and the error term that 
involves unobserved factors such as  abilities.  The  instrumental variable method is a natural 
method to mitigate such a problem using an observable variable that affects schooling 
choices; however, it is uncorrelated with the error term.    As summarized by Card (1999, 
2000), recent studies have begun to employ supply-side variables that capture institutional 
features of the education system such as the minimum school-leaving age, tuition costs, or the 
geographic proximity of schools in order to form credible instrumental variables. 
We augment this strategy by using novel instrumental variables.    In Nepal, the lack   6
of proper education services for those with disabilities has restricted the schooling of children 
with disabilities to institutional settings that often lack the proper facilities and equipment to 
keep them up to speed with their nondisabled counterparts.    Specifically, students with 
disabilities face problems such as inadequate availability of materials on sign language or 
Braille, or, in the case of those with physical impairments, inaccessible buildings.
3  In 
particular, the supply-side constraints are serious for those who are hearing impaired.   
Moreover, whether the impairments are congenital or acquired and the age at which a person 
becomes impaired affects the number of years of schooling, while these variations do not 
affect labor market outcomes directly.  Hence,  we  believe  that  the type of disability and the 
timing of becoming impaired satisfy the criteria of the instruments for schooling choices, i.e., 
 
(2)             S = Zγ + ε,  
 
where Z is a set of observables that affect schooling choices but are uncorrelated with the 
unobserved factors, u, in equation (1), i.e., E(SZ) ≠ 0 and E(Zu) = 0. 
Another econometric consideration is that of sample selection bias.  Since many 
disabled people are unemployed in Nepal, we cannot ignore the endogeneity problem arising 
from labor market participation decisions.   In order to control for the sample selection bias, 
we employ Amemiya’s (1985) Type 1 Tobit model with endogenous regressors.  We adopt 
Newey’s (1987) modified minimum chi-squared estimator with the two-step estimation 
method. 
 
                                                  
3  Indeed, using multiple data-sets from 11 nationally representative household surveys conducted in 
nine countries, Filmer (2005) found that youth with disabilities are almost always substantially less 
likely to start school and more likely to achieve lower schooling attainment. 
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3. Data 
 
The survey for this study was conducted in Nepal’s Kathmandu Valley over the course of two 
study-specific information-gathering trips.  The first and second rounds of the survey were 
conducted from May to June of 2008 for employed respondents, and again from October to 
November of the same year for unemployed respondents, respectively.  The Kathmandu 
Valley is the most populous area of the country, with a total population of approximately one 
million in the Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur districts, including the metropolitan 
capital city of Kathmandu. 
Persons with visual, hearing, and physical impairments were chosen for face-to-face 
interviews using carefully-structured questionnaires.  The term “visual impairment” has 
been used for those who are blind, partially sighted, or have low vision.  For those with 
hearing impairments, people with deafness and hardness of hearing were considered.  
Similarly, we have defined people with physical impairments as those having problems with 
their legs or hands, spinal injuries, and so on.  The term “disability” has been used for all 
types of impairments covered in this study.  To approach these respondents, we randomly 
selected interview participants from the name lists of the five disability-related organizations 
in Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur districts: Nepal Association for the Welfare of the 
Blind (NAWB), Nepal Association of Physically Disabled Persons (NAPD), Nepal 
Association of the Deaf and Hard of Hearing (NADH), Nepal National Federation of the 
Deaf and Hard of Hearing (NFDH), and Nepal Association of the Blind (NAB).    We further 
divided the members and contacts aged between 16 and 65 years in each disability group into 
male and female subgroups. 
Then, out of a total of 993 potential participants who met our age and impairment 
criteria, 423 respondents were randomly selected using proportionate stratified random   8
sampling, in which the individuals’ type of impairments and sex were employed to set each 
stratum.  The study was carried out with informed consent from the participants, who were 
aware that they could withdraw from the study at any time, during or after, without incurring 
any personal consequences.    Only two participants chose to withdraw from the study once it 
was underway; both of these individuals had physical impairments, and the data we collected 
from them has been excluded from our final data set. 
The survey covers a wide variety of socioeconomic information including 
impairment, demographic characteristics, education background, employment status, attitudes 
of family and employers, and income and expenditure.  As regards sociodemographic 
characteristics, the questionnaire covers age, sex, type and cause of disability, marital status, 
family type, and living status, that is, whether the respondent is originally an inhabitant of the 
Kathmandu Valley (someone who has been born in Kathmandu) or had recently migrated 
from some other area of Nepal.  Questions on educational status included the level of 
education obtained, as well as the type and location of the respondent’s school.  Questions 
about skills and training included information about the respondent’s training in Braille or 
sign language, for example, as well as such things as computer and vocational skills.  
Employment-related information included level, type, and sector of employment, current job 




Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper.  Among 
the 398 fully usable responses, 222 respondents (55.8%) currently participate in the labor 
market, while the rest were unemployed at the time of this survey.  The proportion of 
full-time workers was about 41.7%.  The proportion of women respondents was 42%; the   9
average age of the respondents was around 31 years; and the average number of years of 
schooling was 8.84 years, which is roughly equivalent to an upper secondary level of 
education.    The proportions of visually, hearing, and physically impaired people were 30.2%, 
37.9%, and 31.9%, respectively.  Of the respondents with an acquired impairment, 71.1% 
had become disabled before the age of six.  Moreover, 13.6% of the respondents claimed 
that they had received no institutional support for their studies, and a further 23.1% reported 
that their families had suffered financial constraints in order to send them to school.  We 
also found variations in families’ understanding of the rights of their members with 
disabilities and in their views on the general abilities of people with disabilities.   
 
4. Results and findings 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the first-stage regression results with a different set of 
independent variables for two variables—for example, a years-of-schooling variable plus a 
dummy variable which takes one for full-time work and zero otherwise.    According to Table 
2, with regard to the years-of-schooling regression, hearing impairment is shown to have 
negative and statistically significant coefficients.  The point estimate reveals that the years 
of schooling of a hearing-impaired person are fewer than those of visually impaired 
individuals by two years on average.  On the other hand, physically impaired persons have 
an average of 0.9 more years of schooling; however, this result is not statistically significant.   
These findings are consistent with the institutional setting in Nepal, where there are 
insufficient educational resources for hearing-impaired people.  Comparatively, physically 
impaired people face less difficulties in continuing their education in ordinary schools with 
peers without disability as they can receive education through the same method of teaching.  
Furthermore, unless facilities such as an adequate number of sign language interpreters to   10
solve communication problems for hearing-impaired persons are available, it is difficult for 
them to enter the ordinary institutes for higher education.  However, there are no special 
institutes for hearing-impaired persons that offer higher education.  Their fewer years of 
schooling clearly indicate the possible institutional barriers in educational institutes.  
Moreover, our results regarding employment rates reveal a systematic pattern: those who 
become visually or physically impaired are, respectively, more and less likely to obtain 
full-time positions. 
In Table 2, therefore, the findings are threefold.  First, in the schooling regression, 
disability acquired at a later age is correlated with fewer years of schooling.  This is 
consistent with casual observations that when people become disabled later in life, it is often 
difficult for them to readjust to school—for example, learning the use of Braille or sign 
language can pose significant difficulties for older, newly disabled students who were already 
accustomed to one system of learning.  These persons with disabilities are more likely to 
give up their education and, accordingly, the number of years of their schooling will be fewer.   
Second, in the case of those who answered that their family had experienced financial 
difficulties, the numbers of their years of education were significantly fewer than the number 
of years for those who did not report this as a factor.  This indicates the seriousness of the 
financial constraints commonly faced by families living below the poverty level, which 
prevents parents from sending their children with disabilities to school.  Finally, the 
estimation result shows that families’ subjective views on the rights and abilities of people 
with disabilities affect years of schooling significantly.   
In Table 3, we show more elaborated specifications of the first-stage regression.    In 
fact, we have discovered that the previous finding—namely, that disability at a later age is 
correlated with fewer years of schooling—is specific to people with visual impairments.  
Moreover, this negative schooling effect among people with visual impairments is larger if a   11
person becomes visually impaired at a later age.    This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
it is difficult for people who become disabled later in life to readjust to school, particularly 
when it involves learning different, disability-specific skills, such as learning to use Braille or 
Orientation and Mobility (O&M) skills in the case of visually impaired students.  On the 
whole, the age at which a person becomes disabled appears to have a significant impact on 
the number of years they remain in school: specifically, individuals who become disabled 
later tend to have fewer years of schooling. 
Table 4 summarizes our estimated results of wage earnings equations.    The first two 
specifications are based on OLS estimates; the third and fourth control for endogeneity bias 
in labor market participation; and the fifth and sixth specifications consider endogeneity of 
schooling.  The final two specifications utilized a different set of instruments.  In all 
specifications, education influenced wages, but the estimated returns to education vary.  In 
OLS estimates, the rate of return is about 5.3–5.9%, which may be consistent with the 
existing estimate for nondisabled people, as reported by both Card (1999, 2001) and 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2001).    However, once we control for the endogenous sample 
selection bias, the estimated returns to education jump to 21.4–22.9%.  In addition, 
controlling for endogeneity of schooling decisions and full-time working status further 
increases the estimates to 30.4–33.2%. 
These estimates suggest the seriousness of estimation biases in returns to education 
arising from sample selection and endogeneity problems.  Moreover, unlike estimates with 
non-disabled people, comparisons of Tobit and IV-Tobit results imply that years of schooling 
and the error term of the wage equation are negatively correlated, suggesting the existence of 
institutional rigidities in education among people with high unobserved abilities.
4  
                                                  
4  Note that the concept of abilities here is the one used in the context of Micerian wage equation and 
that being disabled does not mean low unobserved abilities.     12
Especially, the systematically fewer years of schooling experienced by hearing-impaired 
individuals imply that there are specific institutional barriers in schooling for people with 
hearing impairments.  The coexistence of high returns to schooling and limited years of 
schooling suggest the existence of credit market imperfections, a finding that is consistent 
with the significantly negative effect of family financial constraints on years of schooling, as 
presented in Tables 2 and 3.  Since human capital cannot be used as collateral in general, 
people cannot invest in education without first having the credit to finance it, even if there is 
a sufficiently large rate of returns.    The government can eliminate these barriers to education 
through appropriate policy interventions to relax the borrowing constraints of families with 




In order to test the robustness of our estimated results, we have performed three 
additional analyses.    First, we used a semi-parametric regression model to relax the function 
form and mitigate specification errors.  Second, we conducted tests to handle the weak 
instrument problem.  In both approaches, we employed the whole sample by setting aside 
the possible sample selection problems in endogenous labor market participation.  Hence, 
the estimated rate of returns to education presented below may involve a downward bias 
arising from the endogenous sample selection problem.  Finally, we employed alternative, 
large-scale, and nationally representative data from NLSS II conducted by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS) of the government of Nepal. 
First, we relaxed the parametric assumption of the returns to education by adopting 
the semi-parametric instrumental variable approach used by Holly and Sargan (1982), 
Blundell et al. (1998), and Gong et al. (2005).  We allowed the education term in equation   13
(1) to be represented by a nonparametric function, while years of education and full-time 
work are both endogenous variables.  Then, we estimated the augmented regression model 
of Holly and Sargan (1982) using Lokshin’s (2006) algorithm, which is based on the 
differencing method in the estimation of the partial linear models introduced by Yatchew 
(1997).
5  The estimation result of the nonparametric part is shown in Figure 1, and the 
significance test of the years-of-schooling variable, which enters the specification nonlinearly, 
indicates that the variable is highly significant, with a p-value of 0.006.    As we can see, the 
returns to education seem to be positive only after a minimum of ten years of schooling.
6  
This result suggests that it is desirable for the government to have a target of providing up to 
at least 10 years of schooling—namely, up to the secondary  school  level.  Thus,  more  people 
with disabilities can stand to benefit from the significant returns to investment in education. 
Second, in order to check the robustness against the weak instrument problem, we 
followed Andrews, Moreira, and Stock (2009), adjusting the critical values of test statistics in 
the presence of weak instruments.  In this model, we allowed endogeneity of the 
years-of-education variable only.    According to the limited information maximum likelihood 
estimate of Andrews, Moreira, and Stock (2009), the returns to education are 19.1%, and 
statistically different from zero: the computed p-values for this coefficient based on the 
conditional likelihood ratio method of Andrews, Moreira, and Stock (2009), the method of 
Anderson and Rubin (1949), and the Lagrange multiplier test proposed by Kleibergen (2002) 
and Moreira (2001) are 0.0083, 0.0005, and 0.0142, respectively.    These results suggest that 
the weak instruments issue is not serious in our analysis. 
Finally, we checked the robustness of the results presented in Table 4 using the 
                                                  
5 In particular, first-order differencing was used to estimate the model. It is assumed that the 
nonparametric part is a smooth function that belongs to a particular parametric family with bounded 
first derivatives. 
6  Note that the unit of the vertical axis is in the raw point estimate and not in percentage.   14
nationally representative data of NLSS II.    The sample is representative of the population of 
the country.  NLSS II is the second multi-topic national household survey conducted by 
CBS from April 2003 to April 2004, after the first NLSS of 1995/96 (NLSS I).    The survey 
follows the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) methodology and 
uses a two-stage stratified sampling scheme covering 3,912 households from 326 Primary 
Sampling Units (PSU) of the country. 
Since NLSS II is not designed to capture impairments and disabilities, there is only 
limited information on persons with disabilities.  In particular, NLSS II does not include 
detailed information on types of impairments, unlike the data employed above.  However, 
we were still able to use the two sets of samples for our analyses: first, the full sample, which 
did not distinguish persons with disabilities from those without disabilities; and, second, the 
sample of those who suffered from a chronic illness, those who could not work because of a 
disability, and those who did not attend school because of the same reason.    Tables 5 and 6 
show the results of the first-stage and the main equations respectively.    According to Table 5, 
years-of-schooling is affected negatively and significantly by financial constraints and 
disability.  These results suggest that there are credit market imperfections as well as 
supply-side constraints in education to accommodate persons with disabilities.  More 
importantly, the age when a person became disabled has a positive effect on 
years-of-schooling in the first specification (1) with the full sample, which is consistent with 
the results reported in Table 4. 
Table 6 shows the main results of estimating returns to investment in education.  
The first two specifications are based on OLS and IV using the full sample, with and without 
disabilities.  The point estimates on the returns to education are 13.1% and 9.1% 
respectively.    These figures are consistent with the estimate made by Parajuli (1999), which 
shows that the returns to education in Nepal are 9.7%.   15
However, once we confined our data to the second sample of the NLSS II data, i.e., 
the sample that dealt with persons with chronic illnesses or disabilities, the returns to 
schooling become significantly higher.  In particular, when we controlled for sample 
selection and endogeneity biases arising, respectively, from endogenous labor participation 
and schooling investments, the returns to education became as high as 19.4%.  Again, this 
result suggests that the estimated rate of returns to education is very high among persons with 
disabilities in Nepal.    Moreover, the higher rate of returns of the IV-Tobit estimates than that 
of OLS estimates suggest that years of schooling and the error term of the wage equation are 
negatively correlated and there are institutional barriers in schooling among people with high 
unobserved abilities 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we estimated the wage returns to education of individuals with 
disabilities in Nepal, using information on the type and duration of the experience of the 
given impairments as identifying instrumental variables.  After controlling for sample 
selection to account for endogenous labor participation, as well as endogeneity of schooling 
decisions and full-time working status, the estimated rate of returns to education is very high, 
ranging from 19.4 to 33.2%.  These estimates, together with OLS estimates, indicate 
significant estimation biases in returns to education arising from sample selection and 
endogeneity biases.  More importantly, our results will be of use to policymakers in the 
future, especially those aiming to facilitate human capital investments among persons with 
disabilities.    First, the implied negative endogeneity bias and a trend of systematically fewer 
years of schooling on the part of hearing-impaired individuals implies that there are 
significant institutional barriers in education especially for people with hearing impairments.    16
This can be eliminated by supply-side interventions aimed at hearing-impaired people.  
Second, the coexistence of a high rate of returns to schooling and a limited number of years 
of schooling suggests the existence of credit market imperfections and/or supply-side 
constraints in education for individuals with disabilities.    The former is also consistent with 
the significant negative effect of family financial constraints on years of schooling.  Again, 
credit provisions or scholarship programs to relax the borrowing constraints of families with 
children with disabilities are suggested as possible policy instruments; supply-side 
interventions will be indispensable for such families.  It is universally acknowledged that 
education is a basic human right.    However, there are also clear economic benefits of higher 
education both for individuals and societies.  Education is a tested and sound means of 
escaping poverty in the developing world; previous studies on returns to education for 
nondisabled individuals in developing countries indicated around 10% wage returns.  
Comparing this figure with our findings of more than 19% returns for individuals with 
disabilities shows just how necessary supporting the education of disabled persons is for their 
advancement, both socially and as individuals. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable name  # of Obs. Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
          
Log hourly income (observed only for labor market 
participants) 
 
222 3.389  1.555  -4.719 6.438
Dummy = 1 if female  398 0.420     
Age  398 31.053  8.131  16 65 
Years of schooling  398 8.844  4.766  0 17 
Dummy = 1 if full-time worker 
  398 0.417     
Dummy = 1 if visually impaired (default category)  398 0.302     
Dummy = 1 if hearing impaired  398 0.379    
Dummy = 1 if physically impaired  398 0.319    
          
Dummy = 1 if congenital disability   
 
398 0.457      
Dummy = 1 if disabled when age is below 6 (default 
category) 
398 0.711      
Dummy = 1 if disabled when age is between 6 and 11  398 0.146    
Dummy = 1 if disabled when age is between 11 and 16  398 0.060    
Dummy = 1 if disabled when age is above 16 
  398 0.083    
Age when a person became disabled  398 4.275  7.225   0  46 
Dummy = 1 if there is no support for studying  398 0.136    
Dummy = 1 if financially constrained  398 0.231    
        
Family’s understanding of the rights of persons with 
disabilities        
    1. Very high (default category)  385 0.200    
  2 .   H i g h   385 0.190    
  3.  Moderate  385 0.270    
  4 .   L o w   385 0.226    
    5. Not at all  385 0.114    
        
Family’s positive view on the ability of persons with 
disabilities        
    1. Very high (default category)  380 0.266    
  2 .   H i g h   380 0.218    
  3.  Moderate  380 0.313    
  4 .   L o w   380 0.150    
    5. Not at all  380 0.053    
        
Dummy = 1 if permanent resident of Kathmandu Valley 
  392 0.500    
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Table 2. First-Stage Regression 
 
Dependent variable Years of 
schooling
   Full-time 
worker
 
  Coef. Std. Err.   Coef.  Std. Err.  
Dummy = 1 if hearing impaired  -2.078  0.598  ***  0.130  0.069  * 
Dummy = 1 if physically impaired  0.895  0.609    -0.338  0.071  ***
Dummy = 1 if congenital disability  -0.245 0.611    -0.305  0.071  ***
Dummy = 1 if disabled when age is between 6 and 11  -0.729  0.900    0.237  0.104  ** 
Dummy = 1 if disabled when age is between 11 and 16  -2.365  1.274  *  0.139  0.148   
Dummy = 1 if disabled when age is above 16  -4.718  2.450  *  0.541  0.284  * 
Age when a person became disabled (which is set at 23 
if above 23) 
0.168 0.126    -0.045  0.015  ***
Dummy = 1 if there is no support for studying  -1.569  0.666  **  -0.208  0.077  ***
Dummy = 1 if financially constrained  -1.501  0.493  ***  -0.127  0.057  ** 
Family’s understanding of the rights of persons with 
disabilities 
    
  2.  High  1.624  0.807  **  0.164  0.094  * 
  3.  Moderate  0.767  0.806    0.047  0.094   
  4.  Low  -0.103  0.890    0.034  0.103   
    5. Not at all  -0.531  0.999    0.069  0.116   
Family’s positive view on the ability of persons with 
disabilities 
    
  2.  High  -1.109  0.747    0.005  0.087   
  3.  Moderate  -1.861  0.746  **  -0.059  0.087   
  4.  Low  -1.947  0.951  **  -0.162  0.110   
    5. Not at all 
 
-1.722 1.197    -0.054  0.139   
Dummy = 1 if permanent resident of Kathmandu Valley
 
-1.892 0.445  *** -0.011  0.052   
Dummy = 1 if female  -0.699  0.456    -0.004  0.053   
Age 0.527  0.154  ***  0.049  0.018  ***
Age squared  -0.008  0.002  ***  -0.001  0.000  ***
Constant 
 
4.335 2.857    -0.059  0.332   
      
Number of observations     
F statistics for the jointly zero coefficients     
[p-value]    











0.1642   
         
Robust standard errors in parentheses.    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%   24
Table 3. First-Stage Regression 
Dependent variable Years of 
schooling
   Full-time 
worker
 
  Coef. Std. Err.   Coef.  Std. Err.  
Dummy = 1 if hearing impaired  -1.157 1.488   0.218  0.172  
Dummy = 1 if physically impaired  2.027 1.302   -0.277  0.151 * 
Dummy = 1 if congenital disability  0.747 1.137   -0.158  0.132  
(interacted with hearing impairment dummy)  -1.419 1.599   -0.240  0.185  
(interacted with physical impairment dummy)  -1.085 1.540   -0.123  0.178  
Dummy = 1 if disabled when age is between 6 and 11  -3.683 1.760 **  0.034  0.204  
(interacted with hearing impairment dummy)  3.465 2.423   0.246  0.280  
(interacted with physical impairment dummy)  4.722 2.405 **  0.246  0.278  
Dummy = 1 if disabled when age is between 11 and 16  -4.822 2.395 **  0.146  0.277  
(interacted with hearing impairment dummy)  3.348 3.430   -0.003  0.397  
(interacted with physical impairment dummy)  2.901 3.440   -0.163  0.398  
Dummy = 1 if disabled when age is above 16  -12.019 4.469 ***  0.235  0.517  
(interacted with hearing impairment dummy)  11.806 5.913 **  0.764  0.684  
(interacted with physical impairment dummy)  10.997 6.685 *  0.243  0.773  
Age when a person became disabled (which is set at 23 
if above 23) 
0.521 0.224 ** -0.030  0.026  
(interacted with hearing impairment dummy)  -0.406 0.333   -0.017  0.039  
(interacted with physical impairment dummy)  -0.577 0.348 *  -0.012  0.040  
Dummy = 1 if there is no support for studying  -1.841 1.710   -0.488  0.198 ** 
(interacted with hearing impairment dummy)  0.409 1.888   0.352  0.218  
(interacted with physical impairment dummy)  0.706 2.969   0.242  0.343  
Dummy = 1 if financially constrained  -1.571 0.505 ***  -0.131  0.058 ** 
Family’s understanding of the rights of persons with 
disabilities 
    
  2.  High  1.809 0.829 **  0.181  0.096 * 
  3.  Moderate  0.895 0.827   0.070  0.096  
  4.  Low  0.075 0.918   0.043  0.106  
    5. Not at all  -0.231 1.024   0.098  0.118  
Family’s positive view on the ability of persons with 
disabilities 
    
  2.  High  -1.235 0.763   -0.003  0.088  
  3.  Moderate  -1.989 0.766 ***  -0.071  0.089  
  4.  Low  -2.001 0.968 **  -0.150  0.112  
    5. Not at all  -2.020 1.229 *  -0.081  0.142  
Dummy = 1 if permanent resident of Kathmandu Valley 
 
-1.873 0.457 *** 0.003  0.053  
Dummy = 1 if female  -0.744 0.469   -0.009  0.054  
Age 0.546 0.158 ***  0.051  0.018 ***
Age squared  -0.008 0.002 ***  -0.001  0.000 ***
Constant 
 
3.087 3.010  -0.184  0.348  
Number of observations     
F statistics for the jointly zero coefficients     
[p-value]    












0.1605   
Robust standard errors in parentheses.    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%   25
Table 4. Estimation Results of Earnings Regression 
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
  OLS  OLS  Tobit Tobit IV-Tobit  IV-Tobit 
          
Years of schooling
+  0.053  0.059  0.229 0.214 0.332 0.304 
  (0.026)**  (0.031)*  (0.060)*** (0.066)*** (0.109)*** (0.100)*** 
          
Dummy = 1 if female  -0.351  -0.288  -0.349 -0.195 -0.083 -0.202 
  (0.245)  (0.23)  (0.562) (0.572) (0.598) (0.558) 
Age  -0.035  -0.025  0.473 0.52  0.206 0.256 
  (0.119)  (0.124)  (0.221)** (0.220)** (0.239)  (0.222) 
Age squared  0.001  0.001  -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)*  (0.003)**  (0.003)  (0.003) 
          
Dummy = 1 if full-time 
worker
+  0.082  -0.01  8.057 7.899 10.971  9.598 
  (0.282)  (0.275)  (0.583)*** (0.612)*** (1.359)*** (1.187)*** 
Dummy = 1 if hearing 
impaired 
  -0.065   -1.519     
   (0.256)   (0.695)**     
Dummy = 1 if physically 
impaired 
  -0.477   -1.891     
   (0.371)   (0.723)***     
         
Constant 2.976  2.975  -16.539 -15.589 -13.982 -13.704 
 (2.012)  (1.959)  (3.811)*** (3.784)*** (3.986)*** (3.733)*** 
         
Number of observations  222  222  398 398 373 373 
R-squared 
 
0.06  0.07      
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
+ endogenous variable 
Specifications (5) and (6) are based on the first-stage regression in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. 
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Table 5. First-Stage Regression 
Dependent variable: Year of Schooling 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 While  Sample 
 
Disabled Sample 
   Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err. 
Dummy = 1 if female  -2.809  (0.145)***  -2.744  (0.575)*** 
Age 0.192  (0.033)***  0.031  (0.143)   
Age squared  -0.003  (0.000)***  -0.001  (0.002)   
Dummy = 1 if born in urban area  4.405  (0.349)***  3.131  (1.030)*** 
Dummy = 1 if not suffered from chronic disease  -0.526  (0.320)**  -1.392  (1.049)   
Dummy = 1 if did not attend school because of disability  -2.465  (2.905)    -1.976  (1.101)** 
Dummy = 1 if financially constrained  -3.888  (0.221)***  -3.635  (0.828)*** 
Age when a person became disabled (which is set at 23 if above 23)  0.189  (0.094)***  0.083  (0.065)   
Constant  -1.030  (2.179)   2.944  (2.713)  
    
















Robust standard errors in parentheses.    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   27 
Table 6. Estimation Results of Earnings Regression 
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









First-stage specification in Table 5   (1)    (2)  (2) 
       
Years  of  Schooling  0.131 0.091 0.156 0.200 0.194 
 (0.004)*** (0.014)*** (0.029)*** (0.080)**  (0.099)** 
Dummy = 1 if female  -0.697  -0.811  -0.559  -0.437  -0.501 
 (0.038)*** (0.054)*** (0.219)**  -0.316  -0.396 
Age  0.082 0.09  0.182 0.175 0.257 
 (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.065)*** (0.053)*** (0.074)***
Age  squared  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)**  (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Dummy = 1 if born in an urban area  0.488  0.673  0.81  0.65  0.841 
 (0.076)*** (0.108)*** (0.269)*** -0.494  -0.616 
Dummy = 1 if not suffered from chronic disease  0.037  0.029  -3.243  -3.164  -5.828 
  -0.073 -0.077 (0.227)*** (0.320)*** (0.630)***
Constant  -0.536 -0.431 -3.559 -3.617 -5.405 
 (0.167)***
 
(0.169)** (1.273)*** (1.038)*** (1.509)***
Number of Observations  3,601  3,601  278  278  278 
R-squared  0.4  0.38 0.56 0.55   
Adjusted R-squared 
 
  0.38  0.54  
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1 Non-Parametric Returns to Education
 